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ABSTRACT
Under the guise of a non-verbal problem solving experiment 
eighty subjects observed a "real life" accident involving two stimulus 
persons. By manipulating the severity of outcome (mild or severe) as 
well as who was hurt (actor or bystander) four accident situations 
were created. Cognitive processes employed to "explain" the occurrence 
of the accident were investigated within the context of "the belief in 
a just world" and seIf-protective attribution of responsibility formula­
tions. It was found that observers differentially rated the stimulus 
persons across experimental conditions and that derrogation of the 
perpetrator occurred when his actions resulted in injury to an innocent 
bystander. The other major finding, that attribution of responsibility 
to a similar stimulus person who perpetrated the event decreased while 
attribution of responsibility to a "third party" increased in severe 
outcome conditions was discussed within the framework of defensive 
attribution. An alternative mode of "explaining" an accident, misper- 
ceiving the event, was identified and discussed.
INTRODUCTION
When an observer witnesses an unfortunate accident, how does 
he perceive and account for the events which occur to others around 
him? Under what conditions will an observer feel sympathy and com­
passion for a suffering victim and under what conditions will he 
reject, or at least blame, those who are unfortunate? Under what 
conditions will observers assign responsibility to those persons 
potentially at fault for an accident? Will an observer come to terms 
with the suffering of an innocent bystander in the same manner as he 
comes to terms with the suffering of a victim who brought about his 
own fate? Perhaps because of the implications for the judicial pro­
cess and the processes of person perception in the last few years, 
investigators have shown increasing interest in these questions 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1973).
Heider's (1958) work on person perception and attribution of 
responsibility has served as the basis for research on these ques­
tions. The basic attribution process refers to the means by which 
people form interpretations or make assumptions about the causes of 
events around them. Kanouse and Hanson (1972) suggest that, in 
general, the attribution process seems to serve an individual's need 
to make sense of his social world. When a perceiver observes a 
specific event he must often engage in the cognitive task of estab­
lishing "sufficient reason" for that action. By attributing
1
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characteristics, intentions, feelings, and traits to objects within 
his social world, the perceiver can answer the question "Why did this 
happen?" Attribution then, is the basic process by which a perceiver 
"explains" the occurrence of events in his world.
Two alternative theoretical positions have been formulated in 
an attempt to spell out the cognitive processes which will lead to 
various reactions on the part of an observer who witnesses an accident. 
The first of these positions, "self-protective attribution" was 
formulated by Walster (1966) and has focused on how observers attri­
bute responsibility for an accident. The other position is based on 
Lerner's (1965) concept of "the belief in a just world" and has 
focused on how observers alter their perceptions of accident victims. 
While both formulations are highly similar, there are important dis­
tinctions between the two.
Walster (1966) proposed the hypothesis that as the conse­
quences of an accident become more severe, greater responsibility for 
the event will be assigned to some appropriate person, often the 
victim. More specifically, she proposed that when an observer wit­
nesses an accident which results in a mild outcome he will reason that 
he could very easily have been involved in a similar set of circum­
stances. Therefore, the observer will attribute the cause of the 
event to "chance." Chance is a sufficient reason to explain the 
occurrence of the accidental event. Thus, Walster maintained that 
under these conditions the observer will often feel sympathy and 
compassion for the victim. Since "chance" adequately explains the
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occurrence of the event the observer will attribute little responsi­
bility to those involved as he goes on his way thinking "too bad" or 
"tough break."
However, when an observer witnesses an accident which results 
in a serious outcome he will not be inclined to attribute the cause 
of the event to chance. If the observer did this, it would carry the 
threatening implication that an accident of equal magnitude could 
perhaps happen to him. In order to protect himself from this thought 
the observer will attribute the cause of the event to some appropriate 
person who will be held responsible. By emphasizing the "different­
ness" of the person the observer can "protect" himself and insulate 
himself from the thought that he could be involved in a similar 
catastrophe.
In order to test this hypothesis Walster (1966) asked subjects 
to listen to tape recorded descriptions of an accident which involved 
an average high school student who parked his car at the top of a hill.
After the student left his car, the brake cable snapped and the car
began to roll down the hill. Waleter created four experimental condi­
tions by varying the severity of the outcome. In one set of conditions 
the car fender was dented (mild outcome) or the car was completely 
destroyed (severe outcome). In the other set of conditions others 
could have been involved (mild outcome) or others were involved as a 
result of being hit by the car (severe outcome). Consistent with 
Walster's expectations it was found that across both conditions
greater responsibility was assigned to the car owner when the
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consequences were severe than when they were mild.
In a subsequent study, Walster (1967) was unable to replicate 
her earlier finding that the attribution of responsibility was depen­
dent upon the severity of the outcome. This subsequent study was 
comprised of two experiments which both followed the same general 
design. Subjects were told of a stimulus person who had purchased a 
home. As a result of an environmental change over which he had no 
control (a mudslide) he had gained or lost varying amounts of money 
on the investment. After the subjects heard of this incident they 
were asked to assess the responsibility of the stimulus person for the 
gain or loss, and were asked to estimate their own confidence that they 
would have anticipated the eventual outcome.
In the first experiment of this study there were significant 
findings which contradicted Walster's previous study. The homeowner 
was assigned less responsibility when the gain or loss was substan­
tial (severe outcome) than when it was inconsequential (mild outcome). 
The results of the second experiment were even more confusing since 
there was no systematic relationship between the attribution 01 
responsibility and the severity of the outcome.
Shaver (1970) attempted to reinterpret these contradictory 
findings by proposing the notion that an important prerequisite for 
the occurrence of seIf-protective attribution of responsibility is 
the possibility that the same accident could happen to the perceiver. 
The existence of this possibility was denoted as "relevance" and 
Shaver maintained that two important preconditions which effect 
relevance are "situational relevance" and "personal similarity" to
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the stimulus person. Shaver reasoned that in the absence of these 
preconditions there would be little or no threat to an observer and 
consequently, there would be no need for him to assign responsibility.
Shaver reasoned that in Walster's (1966) original study the 
situation of an accident involving a high school student was highly 
relevant to a college sophomore. However, in Walster's (1967) sub­
sequent study which involved a homeowner, situational relevance was 
low since very few college sophomores own their own homes. In addi­
tion, personal similarity to the stimulus person was lower in the 
subsequent study since the homeowner was described as an older person.
To test the notion that personal similarity to the stimulus 
person effects attribution of responsibility, Shaver conducted three 
experiments. In the first experiment subjects were presented with an 
altered version of the condition formulated by Walster (1966) in which 
the high school student's car was completely destroyed. Half of the 
subjects were asked to assume that the victim's personal characteris­
tics were very similar to their own and the other half of the subjects 
were asked to assume that the victim's personal characteristics were 
very dissimilar to their own. However, contradictory to his expecta­
tions, Shaver found that less responsibility was assigned to a similar 
stimulus person than to a dissimilar stimulus person.
In the second experiment conducted within this study Shaver 
manipulated similarity to the victim by varying the stimulus person's 
age. Across experimental conditions, Shaver found that heightened 
similarity to the stimulus person again lessened the perceiver's
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attribution of responsibility and increased the ascriptions of careful­
ness to the stimulus person.
Another similar finding was obtained by Shaver in the third 
experiment in this study. Shaver presented subjects with a written 
case history under the guise of a simulated jury study. The subjects 
were told that the case deliberation they were about to read had 
actually been brought to trial but that a mistrial was declared since 
the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
The actual case involved injury to a child who was attending 
the open house of a research and development firm with his parents.
The stimulus person was a mechanical engineer who was demonstrating 
the use of a tensile strength machine. After inserting an alloy 
sample into the machine he was called away to answer a phone call.
While out of the room the alloy sample broke apart violently and a 
metal splinter lodged itself in the child's wrist (mild outcome) or 
in the child's eye causing permanent blindness (severe outcome).
The means for responsibility attributed to the perpetrator 
(the technician) failed to obtain severity-dependent attribution. In 
fact, there was a moderate trend in the opposite direction. This 
apparent reluctance to assign responsibility in the severe condition 
occurred despite differences in the perceived severity of the acci­
dental outcome. However, the severe accident was seen as less fore­
seeable than the mild accident. In addition, the subjects perceived 
the stimulus person as being more careful wben the outcome was severe 
than when the outcome was mild.
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Shaver (1970) concluded that while a certain amount of "rele­
vance" may be necessary for the instigation of self-protective attri­
bution of responsibility, the threshold appears to be low. Once the 
stimulus person becomes highly similar to the perceiver, denials of 
responsibility and ascriptions of carefulness may be employed to avoid 
the negative outcome. Shaver (1970) termed this category of perceiver 
response "defensive attribution."
The results of a study conducted by McKillip and Posovac
(1972) demonstrate the notion of defensive attribution. These inves­
tigators varied the severity of outcome as well as the similarity of 
attitudes between the subject and the victim of an accident. All sub­
jects read a "case history" of an automobile driver who was involved 
in an accident. It was found that for dissimilar subjects greater 
responsibility was attributed to the stimulus person when he suffered 
severe personal injury and caused extensive damage to city property 
(severe outcome) and that less responsibility was attributed to the 
dissimilar stimulus person when he suffered mild personal injury (mild 
outcome). On the other hand, the opposite was true for a similar 
stimulus person. That is, when asked to rate a victim who was re­
ported to hold similar attitudes, less responsibility was assigned 
for the severe outcome and more responsibility was assigned for the 
mild outcome. Apparently, when the stimulus person was reported to 
hold similar attitudes the threshold of similarity was passed. These 
results were interpreted by McKillip and Posovac to support Shaver's 
notion of defensive attribution.
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However, at this juncture it is difficult to evaluate the 
hypothesis that attribution of responsibility will increase with the 
severity of outcome. Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen (1973) have 
pointed out that much of the research in this area is based more on 
speculation and intuitive hypotheses than on a systematic analysis of 
the attribution process.
These inconsistent and contradictory findings may be due to 
other factors as well. For example, while purporting to replicate 
previous research, studies have employed different accidental situa­
tions. They have provided subjects with varying amounts of informa­
tion about the stimulus person. They have presented the "case 
histories" under different ruberics (E.G., jury studies, court cases, 
impression formation, etc.), and different modes of presentation have 
been used (E.G., tape recorded descriptions or printed booklets).
Partly in an attempt to understand these conflicting findings 
investigators have obtained additional measures designed to assess 
the subjects' perceptions of the hypothetical situations. Thus, sub­
jects have been asked whether the victim had been careless, whether 
he was conscientious, whether he could have foreseen the consequences, 
etc. Unfortunately, the use of these questions has shed little light 
on the attribution of responsibility and no consistent patterns have 
been obtained (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1973).
Although the data are certainly inconclusive, Walster’s theo­
retical notion still retains plausibility, due to its similarity to 
other formulations. The other theoretical formulation which appears
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to be equally plausable is the "just world" hypothesis developed by 
Lerner and his colleagues (Lerner, 1965; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner 
and Matthews, 1967). Lerner has proposed that people are inclined to 
believe in a "just world," a world in which people get what they 
deserve and, conversely, deserve what they get, based upon their 
actions. According to this formulation, if something unpleasant 
happens to an individual he is seen as deserving it for one of three 
reasons: (a) because he is an intrinsically evil person and his
character merits the fate; (b) because he has behaved in a specific 
and direct manner to bring about the bad outcome; or (c) chance.
An observer is able to tolerate viewing an accident which 
results in minor outcomes because there is little threat to his belief 
in a just world. When an observer witnesses the victim of a mild 
accident he is usually able to ascribe some misdeed to him, or ascribe 
the consequence to chance. Therefore, the observer can maintain his 
belief in a just world since the victim got what he deserved based on 
his actions or chance. The observer can cognitively reason, "He 
should have been looking" or "He should have known better." In this 
situation social justice has been restored.
However, when an observer witnesses a severe accident and he 
cannot ascribe the suffering to some misdeed or chance, the belief in 
a "just world" is threatened. The possibility that one can suffer a 
severe accident without somehow being responsible is socially unjust. 
This is an unfair situation and the observer feels uncomfortable espe­
cially when he knows that the suffering will continue or that he is
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unable to alter the victim's fate. In order for the observer to 
restore his belief in a just world he will derrogate the victim by 
viewing him as a bad or undesirable person who deserves to suffer.
Thus, in this way social justice can be restored. An extension of this 
formulation is that an observer will in turn assign more responsibility 
to a victim who suffers severe consequences by virtue of the victim's 
undesirable character. Thus, the observer can restore social justice 
by maintaining the cognition, "He deserved his fate and he is respon­
sible for it because he is a bad and undesirable person."
One example of this cognitive process was quoted by Michner 
(1971). Following the tragic shooting of four college students at 
Kent State a high school teacher was quoted as saying that the slain 
students deserved to die. This teacher added that, "Anyone who 
walked the streets of Kent with long hair and dirty clothes deserves 
to be shot." Apparently, by derrogating these students and viewing 
them as "bad" or "undesirable" people who deserved their fate, the 
teacher was able to restore her belief in a "just world."
Lerner and Simmons (1966) demonstrated this notion when they 
asked subjects to observe emotional cues of a peer (the victim) who 
was participating in a paired associate learning task. The victim, as 
a result of making the usual errors, appeared to suffer from severe 
and painful electric shocks which served as a negative reinforcement.
In describing the suffering victim after these observations, the 
subjects rejected and devalued her when they believed that they would 
continue to see her suffer or when they were unable to alter the 
victim's fate.
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These results were interpreted to support the hypothesis that 
rejection and devaluation of the victim were primarily based on the 
observer's need to believe in a "just world." In this study the 
victim's actions (making expected errors) did not merit the fate 
(suffering severe shocks). Since no misdeed could be ascribed to the 
victim, observers develued her and convinced themselves that she 
deserved her fate on the basis of being an undesirable person.
A further test of Lerner's just world hypothesis was con­
structed by Costelloe and Prestholdt (1973). In this study each 
observer believed that he was the only eyewitness to a live accident 
in which a perpetrator examined expensive electronic equipment. As a 
result of this action the perpetrator received an electric shock 
(severe outcome) or was not hurt (mild outcome). Consistent with 
their expectations, observers who viewed the severe outcome condi­
tion devalued the victim by viewing him less favorably than did the 
observers who viewed the mild outcome condition. In addition, the 
stimulus person who suffered the severe outcome was seen as more de­
serving of a monetary punishment than the stimulus person who 
suffered the mild outcome.
These results were interpreted as further support for the just 
w o l Id hypothesis. Apparently, when the victim was not hurt a socially 
just situation existed. However, when the victim was hurt his actions 
(examining the equipment) did not merit his fate (receiving the shock). 
Thus, in order to restore their belief in a just world observers derro- 
gated the victim when he suffered the severe outcome. In this situation,
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the victim was seen as deserving his fate by virtue of being a "bad" 
and "undesirable" person.
The studies conducted on the just world hypothesis have gen­
erally yielded a more consistent pattern of results than studies con­
ducted on the attribution of responsibility. One reason for this 
difference may be that the two formulations have employed different 
methodologies. While researchers conducting studies on the attribution 
of responsibility have asked subjects to read written case histories 
of hypothetical events reported to have happened in the past, Lerner 
and his colleagues have had the subjects serve as observers of "real 
life" events. Therefore, while subjects in the attribution of respon­
sibility studies have had to guess about outcomes and the actual 
events which were reported to have taken place, Lerner's subjects were 
able to personally experience the events.
There are also other important differences between the two 
formulations. One different ; is the stimulus person which was rated. 
While the research conducted on the attribution of responsibility has 
focused on the perpetrator of the accident, the research conducted on 
the just world hypothesis has focused on the victim of the accident. 
Thus, the stimulus persons are different. Each theory focuses on one 
stimulus person but in one case the stimulus person is the perpetrator 
of the accident, in the other case the stimulus person is the victim 
of the accident.
Another important difference between the two formulations is 
the dependent measure employed. While the studies conducted on the
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attribution of responsibility have manipulated the severity of outcome 
and then collected measures of responsibility attributed to the 
stimulus person, studies conducted on the just world hypothesis have 
manipulated the consequence to the victim and then collected measures 
of person perception.
Furthermore, it is plausable that Walster's notion of self- 
protective attribution of responsibility and Lerner's "belief in a just 
world" are not competing explanations but are, in fact, two separate 
and distinct modes which observers may employ in order to come to terms 
with an accident. Thus, an observer could attempt to protect himself 
by attributing responsibility to the perpetrator and/or derrogate the 
victim thereby restoring his belief in a just world. By engaging in 
either of these cognitive processes the observer may be able to 
"explain" the occurrence of the accident.
It is also conceivable that a third possibility exists which 
would enable an observer to "explain" the occurrence of an accident. 
Specifically, by misperceiving the event or the actors behavior, 
observers may be able to reconstruct the actual event in an eyewitness 
account as they would have liked it to have happened. This mode of 
coming to terms with an accident has received little or no attention in 
the literature on attribution processes.
The present study was designed in an attempt to systematically 
investigate whatever cognitive processes are employed by observers in 
order to explain the occurrence of an accident. To do this, Walster's 
(1966) notion of self-protective attribution of responsibility, Shaver's
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(1970) notion of defensive attribution, Lerner's (1965) belief in a 
just world, as well as eyewitness accounts of the accident were all 
under investigation as possible explanations of the attribution 
process.
In order to investigate these various processes four accidental 
situations were created in such a way that each observer believed that 
he was the only eyewitness to observe a "real world" accident. It was 
expected that by providing a "real life" situation the observer's 
need to engage in attribution processes would be aroused to a greater 
extent than if they simply read a case history of an accident. A 
real world situation also provided an opportunity to collect a number 
of dependent measures on different aspects of the accident so that a 
more complete picture could be provided.
A major purpose of this study was to provide a more complete 
picture of the processes employed by subjects to "explain" an accident. 
Thus, the subjects in the present study observed and evaluated two 
stimulus persons. One stimulus person was an innocent bystander 
and the other was the actor who perpetrated the accident. By mani­
pulating the severity of outcome (mild or severe) as well as who 
was hurt (actor or bystander) the present study served as a conceptual 
replication of studies on self protective attribution of responsibility 
as well as on the just world hypothesis.
In addition, the present study extended the research on the 
just world hypothesis by collecting person perception measures on both 
the innocent bystander and the perpetrator. At the same time, the
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present study extended the self-protective attribution of responsibil­
ity research by collecting measures of responsibility attributed to 
the perpetrator as well as the bystander. By collecting these depen­
dent variables the present study was able to provide a test of inter­
actions which may occur between the two formulations.
In addition, since Walster (1966) raised the possibility that 
in certain situations there may be a tendency on the part of observers 
to attribute responsibility to a "third party" potentially at fault 
but not directly involved in an accident, measures of responsibility 
attributed to a third party (the experimenter) were also collected in 
this study. Following her original hypothesis Walster suggested that 
greater responsibility would be attributed to a third party as the 
severity of outcome increased. However, this possibility has not been 
previously investigated.
In the present study, then, the subjects observed a situation 
in which an actor inspected expensive electronic equipment. In one set 
of conditions the actor hurt himself as a result of this action and 
suffered from a mild electric shock (self-mild outcome condition) or 
the actor hurt himself and suffered from a severe electric shock (self- 
severe outcome condition). In the other set of conditions the actor 
hurt the bystander who suffered from the mild electric shock (other-mild 
outcome condition) or the actor hurt the bystander who suffered from 
the severe electric shock (other-severe outcome condition).
After the subject had observed one of the accidental outcomes 
the person perception measures were collected on both stimulus persons
16
and measures of responsibility attributed to each of those persons 
potentially at fault for the accident were collected. The observers' 
eyewitness accounts of the accident were tape recorded along with the 
responses to several specific questions about the accident.
Any predictions made in this study are necessarily tenuous, 
since they are based on theoretical statements which are incomplete 
and in early stages of development. Therefore, these statements are 
serving as "functional theories" which guide rather than specify the 
predictions of this study.
The hypotheses of the present study fall into three major cate­
gories. The first category deals with measures of responsibility attri­
buted to the stimulus persons. The second category deals with the 
observers' perceptions of the stimulus persons. The final category 
deals with the observers' eyewitness accounts of the accident.
Attribution of Responsibility
(a) Based on Walster's (1966) notion of self protective attribution 
of responsibility it was predicted that as the consequences of 
the outcome became more severe greater degrees of responsibility 
would be attributed to those persons potentially at fault for 
the accident. More specifically, it was predicted that 
observers would attribute more responsibility to the actor
and to the bystander in the severe outcome condition than in 
the mild outcome condition.
(b) By extending Walster's hypothesis of self-protective attribu­
tion of responsibility it was also predicted that more
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responsibility would be attributed to a third party (the 
experimenter) potentially at fault for the accident in the 
severe outcome condition than in the mild outcome condition.
Person Perception
(c) Based on Lerner's (1965) just world hypothesis it was pre­
dicted that as the consequences of the outcome became more
severe observers would derogate the stimulus persons. More 
specifically, it was predicted that observers would perceive 
both the actor and the bystander less favorably in the 
severe outcome conditions than in the mild outcome conditions.
(d) By applying Lerner's just world hypothesis to the present
study it was expected that when the bystander was not hurt
observers would perceive this as a just situation. However, 
when the bystander was injured as a result of the actor's 
action it was expected that observers would perceive tnis as 
an unjust situation. Thus, it was predicted that when the 
innocent bystander was injured observers would attempt to 
restore their belief in a just world by derogating the by­
stander and by perceiving him less favorably than when he was 
not hurt.
(e) Assuming that a just world situation applied to the actor it 
was expected that when the actor hurt himself, observers 
might perceive this as a just situation since the actor got 
what he deserved based on his actions. However, it was pre­
dicted that when the actor's actions resulted in injury to
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the bystander this might be perceived as a socially unjust 
situation. Therefore, it was predicted that when the actor 
hurt the bystander he would also be derogated and viewed 
less favorably than when he hurt himself.
(f) In addition, it was predicted that since the actor's actions 
always resulted in injury to someone he would be perceived 
less favorably than the bystander across all treatment condi­
tions .
Eyewitness Account
(g) Based on a previous study conducted by Costelloe and Prestholdt
(1973), it was predicted that when the outcome of the accident 
was severe observers would give more detailed and accurate 
descriptions of the event than when the outcome was mild.
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects were 80 college sophomores enrolled in introduc­
tory psychology courses at Louisiana State University. The subjects 
were equally divided by sex. Each subject received extra course 
credit for his participation. When the subjects were recruited the 
experimenter informed the class that they had been randomly selected 
to serve as observers in a non-verbal problem experiment while the 
students in two other classes had been selected to serve as the 
participants who would engage in the actual puzzle assembly task.
To insure the welfare and protection of the subjects the 
Director of Student Health Services screened the medical records of 
each volunteer. Those volunteers with high blood pressure, heart con­
ditions or severe emotional problems were not used in this study. 
Furthermore, each subject was observed at all times during his partici 
pation in this study.
Procedure
Each subject reported to the experimental room individually. 
When the subject arrived the experimenter introduced himself and intro 
duced the subject to his assistant who was working in a small room 
across the hall. The experimenter then provided the subject with the 
following rationale for the experiment:
19
20
I am interested in correlating the time it takes
two people to solve a problem with the number of non­
verbal cues they use to communicate with each other.
In this case the problem will be the assembly of a 
cardboard puzzle (pointing to puzzle). Also, I want 
to see if observers can objectively record these non­
verbal cues which they observe. Your task will be to 
serve as an observer and to record the cues on this 
non-verbal checklist.
The experimenter then wrote an "A" and "B" on a blackboard
in this room and informed the subject that the participant who sat
on the left was to be referred to as "A" and the participant sitting 
on the right was to be referred to as "B."
After answering any questions about the checklist (Appendix 
A) the experimenter pointed out a one way mirror on the wall and 
conducted the subject to an observation room where he turned on a 
T.V. camera situated behind this mirror. The experimenter then 
pointed to the camera cables which lead to a T.V. monitor in which 
the subject could now view the experimental room and the "A" and "B" 
which the experimenter had just written on the blackboard. The experi­
menter then handed the subject a set of earphones and stated:
Since the participants are not aware that they 
are being observed it is important that you remain in 
this room. I will return here when we are done to 
collect your non-verbal checklist and at that time I 
would like you to record your impressions of the 
participants, so please stay here until I return.
Remember, I don't want them to know about you.
Following a knock on the door the experimenter left apparently 
to conduct the experiment while the subject remained in this room 
watching the T. V. monitor. In actuality, what the subject viewed 
was one of four pre-recorded video tapes. The video tape deck was
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set up and run by the experimenter. The experimenter's assistant who 
collected the dependent measures was always blind as to which tape the 
subject viewed.
All four video tapes began with the experimenter entering the 
experimental room with a participant (referred to as the actor or A). 
The experimenter then introduced himself and stated;
Your name is Tom,right? (checks name off list)
Another student is scheduled to be here in a minute.
When he arrives I will explain your task.
A sat down at a table in the center of this room and examined 
the pieces of the puzzle on this table. After a short time he turned 
his chair around and intently looked at some of the equipment in this 
room. This equipment included a Skinner Box, a marble counting 
apparatus, rat mazes, reaction timers and many other small pieces of 
equipment. A then focused his attention on a large electronic relay 
unit which consisted of a large panel of gauges and switches connected 
to an adjacent panel resembling a telephone operator's switchboard. At 
this point a second participant arrived (bystander or B). The experi­
menter introduced himself and introduced the two participants (A and B). 
When they had both been seated at the table in the center of this room 
they were given the following instructions;
Your task is to work together as a team to assemble 
the pieces of this puzzle as quickly as possible (points 
to puzzle). The only stipulation is that you cannot talk 
to each other. You can use whatever non-verbal cues you 
can think of to communicate to your partner. In fact, 
this is what I want you to do. Be as creative as you can 
but don't communicate verbally. You will have a ten minute 
limit to complete the puzzle. After you have worked for 
five minutes we will take a short break and then work for 
another five minutes.
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At this point B asked, "What do I do if I need a piece that 
he has?" The experimenter responded, "Point, wave your hand, do what­
ever you can to let him know which piece you need." B stated, "O.K., 
now I see" and they began assembling the puzzle. After working for 
five minutes the experimenter told A and B to stop and take a short 
break. The experimenter added, "I'm going across the hall to get 
some forms I will need you to fill out when we are done. I'll be 
back in a minute." Both participants then got up and stretched after 
the experimenter had left this room. B then turned around, leaned on 
the electronic relay unit and lit a cigarette. A then walked around 
the room and then went over to the other end of this relay unit.
While B was looking the other way A started to tamper with some of 
the switches on this electronic equipment. A then flipped several 
switches and unplugged several wires. From this point on the video 
tapes differed depending upon the subject's experimental condition.
Self-Mild Outcome Condition.--In this condition A plugged the 
wires into different sockets and flipped several switches. When he 
flipped another switch he jumped back from the relay unit clasping 
his hand appearing as though he had received a mild electric shock, 
jl looked on in amazement. The experimenter then reentered this room 
and calmly took control of the situation. Looking at B the experi­
menter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment.' You can go but 
before you do I need you to go across the hall and ask 
my assistant in the white lab coat to come here.
B immediately left the room. The experimenter then turned to
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A and asked him if he was alright. A stated that he was O.K. but that 
he had received a mild electric shock. At this point the assistant's 
shoulder appeared in the T.V. monitor and the experimenter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment! I'm not sure what 
happened but this guy was shocked. It was only a mild 
shock but I'm going to take him to the infirmary anyhow.
Please finish up for me.
The experimenter then left this room with A who was still 
holding his hand. After a short time,the assistant entered the observa­
tion room and administered the dependent measures.
Self-Severe Outcome Condition.--In this condition A plugged 
the wires into different sockets and flipped several switches. When 
he flipped another switch a flash of light and cloud of smoke emitted 
from the relay unit appearing as though an electrical explosion had 
occurred. A reeled backward from the relay unit, screamed and gasped 
and then knelt on the floor as though suffering from a severe electric 
shock. B looked on in amazement. The experimenter then rushed back 
into this room and took control of the situation. Looking at B the 
experimenter stated;
I'm going to stop the experiment.' You can go but 
before you do I need you to go across the hall and ask 
my assistant in the white lab coat to come here.
B immediately left the room. The experimenter knelt down as
though he was talking to A. At this point the assistant's shoulder
appeared in the T.V. monitor and the experimenter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment.' I'm not sure what 
happened but this guy was shocked. It was a very severe 
shock and I'm going to take him to the infirmary. Please 
finish up for me.
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The experimenter then helped A walk out of the room. A was 
limping badly. The subject then viewed the empty room. After a short 
time the experimenter's assistant entered the observation room and 
administered the dependent measures.
Other-Mild Outcome Condition.--In this condition A plugged the 
wires into different sockets and flipped several switches. When he 
flipped another switch B jumped back from the relay unit clasping his 
hand appearing as though he had received a mild electric shock. A 
looked on in amazement. The experimenter then reentered this room 
and calmly took control of the situation. Looking at A the experimenter 
stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment! You can go but 
before you do I need you to go across the hall and ask 
my assistant in the white lab coat to come here.
A immediately left the room. The experimenter turned to B and
asked him if he was alright. B stated that he was O.K. but that he had
received a mild electric shock. At this point the assistant's shoulder
appeared in the T.V. monitor and the experimenter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment! I'm not sure 
what happened but this guy was shocked. It was only 
a mild shock but I'm going to take him to the infirmary 
anyhow. Please finish up for me.
The experimenter then left this room with B who was still 
holding his hand. After a short time the assistant entered the obser­
vation room and administered the dependent measures.
Other-Severe Outcome Condition.--In this final condition A 
plugged the wires into different sockets and flipped several switches.
25
When he flipped another switch a flash of light and cloud of smoke 
emitted from the relay unit. B reeled backward from the relay unit, 
screamed and gasped and then knelt on the floor as though suffering from
a severe electric shock. A looked on in amazement. The experimenter
then rushed back into this room and took control of the situation. 
Looking at A the experimenter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment! You can go but
before you do I need you to go across the hall and ask
my assistant in the white lab coat to come here.
A immediately left the room. The experimenter knelt down as
though talking to B. At this point the assistant's shoulder appeared
in the T.V. monitor and the experimenter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment! I'm not sure
what happened but this guy was shocked. It was a very
severe shock and I'm going to take him to the infirmary.
Please finish up for me.
The experimenter then helped B walk out of the room. B was 
limping badly. The subject then viewed the empty room. After a short 
time the experimenter's assistant entered the observation room and 
administered the dependent measures.
In each condition, when the experimenter's assistant entered 
the observation room he walked over to the T.V. monitor and turned it 
off. He then stated to the subject:
One of the participants you were observing was hurt 
and Gig is taking him to the infirmary. He asked me to 
look over your non-verbal checklist and to have you fill 
out the impression questionnaires even though the puzzle 
wasn't completed. I need you to fill out one of these 
forms for each of the participants you observed. Remember,
"A" was sitting on the left and "B" was sitting on the 
right. While you fill these out I'll look over your checklist
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in the other room. When you're done come back over 
there.
The assistant then collected the non-verbal checklist and handed 
the subject the impression formation questionnaire. The assistant then 
returned to the experimental room and waited for the subject to return 
there after completing these forms. In actuality, the impression 
formation questionnaire was a person perception measure designed to 
assess the dispositional characteristics which the subjects attributed 
to each stimulus person. This measure was composed of 16 bi-polar 
adjective scales. Each scale was a nine-point continuum. The scales 
included in this measure were: Good-Bad, Likeable-Unlikeable,
Desirable-Undesirable, etc. (Appendix B). When the subject returned 
to the experimental room the assistant collected the completed person 
perception measure.
The assistant then asked the subject to give his eyewitness 
account of the accident by stating, "Before he left for the infirmary 
the experimenter asked me to find out as much as I could about what 
happened. You were the only one who saw what happened. Please tell me 
what happened while the experimenter was out of the room." In 
actuality, the subject's eyewitness account of the accident was tape 
recorded so that independent judges could conduct a content analysis 
on the reports of the accident. Specifically, this measure was 
designed to identify the cognitions, justifications and distortions 
that observers employed in order to come to terms with the accident. 
After the subject had given his eyewitness account of the
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accident the assistant asked several specific questions designed to 
assess the subject's perceptions of the accident. This semi-structured 
interview was composed of the following questions: 1) "Let's talk
about the guy on the right, did he turn the machine on?" "Why?"
2) "Did he flip any switches?" 3) "Then what happened to him?" 4) "How 
did he act? How did he look?" 5)"Do you think he intended to do it?"
6) "Well, I want to find out how responsible you think Tom is for what
happened. If we could imagine a scale of responsibility from one to
ten with one being not responsible and ten being completely respon­
sible, where would you place Tom on that scale? The other guy? The 
experimenter?" The assistant then asked specific questions about the 
bystander. 7) "Did he see what Tom was doing?" "How did he look?"
8) Was he hurt? and 9) "If there are medical costs or expenses to 
repair the equipment, what percentage of the total costs do you think 
Tom should pay?", "The other guy should pay?", "The experimenter should 
pay? '
After the subject had answered these specific questions he was 
debriefed. Both the experimenter and the assistant informed the
subject of the true nature of the experiment and answered any questions 
asked by the subjects.
RESULTS
Person Perception
The person perception data was analyzed using a repeated 
measures analysis of variance with a 2 x 2 x 2 (Severity of Outcome x 
Accident Victim x Sex) factorial arrangement of treatments on the whole 
plot with one split plot factor, the stimulus person who was rated 
(Rating). This computer program developed by Barr and Goodnight 
(1971) generated exact probabilities for each F-test. A Duncan 
Multiple Range Test was performed on all pairs of the means involved 
in the significant interactions.
One question of interest in this study was whether or not the 
observers would differentially rate the innocent bystander and the 
actor who perpetrated the accident. In order to provide an overall 
test of this question the scores on four bi-polar items which directly 
measured affect toward the stimulus persons were pooled. This measure 
was composed of the following affect items; Good-Bad, Likeable- 
Unlikeable, Pleasant-Unpleasant, and Desirable-Undesirable. A highly 
significant rating main effect (F=6.45; 1 and 72 d.f.; p=.0122) indi­
cated that across all experimental conditions the bystander was per­
ceived significantly more favorably than the actor on this pooled 
measure of person perception. In order to test for the consistency of 




The analysis of the individual person perception items yielded 
the same highly significant and consistent pattern as the pooled 
person perception variables (Table 1). The actor who perpetrated the 
accident was perceived as less cooperative, less good, less pleasant, 
less lucky, less kind, less helpful, less benevolent and as less 
careful than the bystander. However, on the event related items more 
directly related to the situation the actor was perceived as more 
aggressive, more active and as more curious than the bystander. The 
only positive characteristic attributed to the actor was attractive­
ness. While the actor was rated as more attractive than the bystander, 
this finding was interpreted to reflect differences in the actual 
physical appearance of the stimulus persons. These highly signifi­
cant and consistent differences in the perception of the stimulus 
persons indicated that the observers did differentially rate the actor 
and the bystander.
A second question of interest was whether or not the severity 
of outcome would effect the observers perceptions of the stimulus 
persons. Based on Lerner's just world hypothesis it was predicted 
that the observers would perceive both the actor and the bystander less 
favorably in the severe outcome condition than in the mild outcome con­
dition. However, the results of the Severity of Outcome main effects 
were not significant for any of the person perception variables. 
Apparently, in this study, increased suffering to the actor and to the 
bystander did not threaten the observer's belief in a just world and 
did not lead to derrogation of the stimulus persons. Therefore, this 
hypothesis was not supported.
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TABLE 1
MEAN RATINGS OF ACTOR AND BYSTANDER ON 
PERSON PERCEPTION MEASURES*
Variable Actor Bystander p
Pooled 25.18 26.50 .0122
Cooperative 7.21 7.78 .0083
Good 6.26 6.91 .0005
Aggressive 7.10 6.40 .0839
Pleasant 6.53 7.11 .0034
Kind 6.03 6.70 .0006
Active 7.30 6.80 .1253
Lucky 4.90 4.40 .1465
Attractive 6.12 5.31 .0005
Curious 7.55 6.02 .0002
He lpful 6.79 7.59 .0122
Benevolent 5.93 6.53 .0149
Careful 5.01 6.58 .0002
Note.-All person perception measures in this experiment were 9-unit 
sea les.
* Higher score indicates more favorable impression.
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While there were no significant differences produced by the 
severity of outcome manipulation a Rating x Severity of Outcome inter­
action did approach significance on the item of Careful-Careless 
(F=3.68; 1 and 72 d.f.; p.=.0558). A post anova test performed on 
this interaction indicated that while the observers did not signifi­
cantly alter their perceptions of the bystander across the severity 
conditions, they did perceive the actor as being significantly more 
careful when the outcome was severe than when the outcome was mild 
(Diff. = 1.20; p. <.05).
A question of primary interest was whether or not who was 
injured (actor or bystander) would effect the observer's perceptions 
of the stimulus persons. It was expected that when the actor's 
behavior resulted in injury to the bystander, observers would perceive 
this as an unjust situation since the bystander had done nothing to 
merit this fate. Therefore, it was predicted that observers would 
come to terms with this unjust situation by derrogating the bystander 
and view him less favorably than when he was not injured.
In addition, assuming that a just world situation applied to 
the actor, it was predicted that observers might also derrogate the 
actor when he injured the bystander since his behavior produced the 
unjust situation.
A highly significant Accident Victim x Rating interaction (F= 
8.69; 1 and 72 d.f.; p.=.0046) for the pooled person perception mea­
sures indicated that who was injured did effect the observers percep­
tions of the stimulus persons (Table 2). However, the results of the
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TABLE 2
MEAN RATING OF ACTOR AND BYSTANDER AS A 
FUNCTION OF ACCIDENT TYPE*
Actor Hurts Self Actor Hurts Other
Variable Bystander Actor Bystander Actor P-
Pooled 26.3 26.5 26.8 24.0 .0046
Cooperative 7.8 7.7 7.8 6.8 .0199
Good 6.8 6.5 7.0 6.0 .0184
Pleasant 6.9 6.8 7.3 6.3 .0241
Creative 6.2 6.7 6.3 5.9 .0997
Lucky 5.9 4.6 4.8 5.3 .0056
Desirable 5.5 6.0 5.4 5.3 .0236
Careful 7.0 6.7 6.3 5.4 .0650
* Higher score indicates more favorable perception.
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post anova test performed on all the pairs of means involved in the 
significant interaction indicated that there were no significant 
differences between the observers perceptions of the bystander across 
the accident victim conditions. This finding indicated that observers 
did not view the bystander less favorably when he was injured than 
when he was not injured. Therefore,the hypothesis predicting derroga- 
tion of the bystander when he was injured was not supported.
On the other hand, the results of the post anova test indicated 
that the observers derrogated the actor and viewed him significantly 
less favorably when he hurt the bystander than when he hurt himself 
(Diff. = 2.30; p. <".01). Thus, this finding supported the prediction 
of derrogation of the actor when he injured the bystander.
The analysis of the Accident Victim x Rating interactions for 
the individual person perception items yielded the same highly signif­
icant and consistent pattern as the pooled person perception variables. 
That is, when the actor injured the bystander he was perceived as 
significantly less cooperative, less good, less creative, less desir­
able and as less careful than when he hurt himself. These results 
further supported the hypothesis that the actor would be derrogated and 
viewed less favorably when he hurt the bystander than when he hurt 
himseIf.
The Lucky-Unlucky item did not follow this pattern. On this 
measure the actor was rated as most lucky when he hurt the bystander 
and as least lucky when he hurt himself. On the other hand, the by­
stander was rated as most lucky when the actor hurt himself and as least
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lucky when he was hurt. Thus, each stimulus person was rated as most 
lucky when the other stimulus person was injured.
Although there were no specific hypotheses regarding the vari­
able of sex, a significant Severity of Outcome x Accident Victim x Sex 
interaction (F=8.68; 1 and 72 d.f,; p.=.0433) indicated that the sex 
of the observer interacted with the perceptions of the stimulus persons. 
The results of the post anova test performed on all the pairs of 
means involved in the significant interaction indicated that the 
female observers were relatively unaffected either by the severity of 
outcome or by who was hurt. On the other hand, while male observers 
did not significantly differ in their perceptions of the stimulus per­
sons in the severe outcome conditions, there were significant differ­
ences in their perceptions of the stimulus persons when the outcome 
was mild, (Figure 1). Specifically, when the actor hurt himself 
mildly, both stimulus persons were perceived most favorably. However, 
when the actor hurt the innocent bystander mildly, both stimulus persons 
were derogated and viewed less favorably than when the actor hurt him­
self mildly (Diff.=1.30; p .05). While the reverse relationship was 
observed in the severe, outcome condition, the differences between the 
means were not significant.
Attribution of Responsibility
The responsibility data were analyzed using a repeated measures 
analysis of variance with a 2 x 2 x 2 (Severity of Outcome x Accident 




































Figure 1. Mean favorability of stimulus persons as a 
function of accident type and severity of 
outcome for male and female observers on 
pooled person perception measure.*
* Higher score indicated more favorable perception.
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one factor, stimulus person rated (Rating) on the split plot. In 
addition, the responsibility data were further analyzed separately with 
a completely randomized design with a 2 x 2 x 2 (Severity of Outcome x 
Accident Victim x Sex) factorial arrangement of treatments for each 
stimulus person rated (actor, bystander, or experimenter). A Duncan 
Multiple Range Test was performed on all pairs of means involved in the 
significant interactions.
The question of primary importance in this study focused on how 
observers would attribute responsibility to those persons potentially 
at fault for the accident. A highly significant Rating main effect 
(F=18.63; 2 and 144 d.f.; p.=.0001) revealed that over all conditions 
observers attributed the greatest amount of responsibility to the actor 
who perpetrated the accident (X=7.47), the next greatest amount of 
responsibility was attributed to the experimenter (X=2.62), and the 
least amount of responsibility was attributed to the innocent bystander 
(X=1.60). The results of the post anova test indicated that the mean 
of responsibility attributed to the actor differed significantly from 
the mean of responsibility attributed to the experimenter (Diff.=4.85; 
p. <.001). Also, the mean of responsibility attributed to the experi­
menter differed significantly from the mean of responsibility attributed 
to the bystander (Diff.=1.02; p.<.05). These results are presented in 
Table 3.
Based upon Walster's formulation of self-protective attribution 
of responsibility it was predicted that observers would attribute more 
responsibility to the actor and to the bystander when the outcome of
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TABLE 3
MEAN RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTED TO THE STIMULUS 
PERSONS AS A FUNCTION OF THE 





Bystander 1.33 1.88 1.60
Actor 8.05 6.90 7.47
Experimenter 1.50 3.03 2.62
* Higher value indicates greater responsibility.
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the accident was severe than when the outcome was mild. While the 
observers did attribute a greater amount of responsibility to the by­
stander in the severe outcome condition than in the mild outcome condi­
tion the differences in attributed responsibility did not approach 
significance. Thus, the hypothesis predicting responsibility attribu­
tion to the bystander was not supported.
A significant Severity of Outcome main effect for the actor 
(F=4.00; 1 and 72 d.f.; p.=.0464) indicated that the observers attri­
buted significantly more responsibility to the actor when the outcome 
was mild than when the outcome was severe. This result is directly 
opposite to the prediction based on Walster's formulation.
In addition., by extending Walster's formulation it was predicted 
that observers would attribute more responsibility to a third party 
(the experimenter) in the severe outcome condition than in the mild 
outcome condition. A highly significant Severity of Outcome main 
effect (F=6.80; 1 and 72 d.f.; p.=.0107) indicated that observers 
attributed significantly more responsibility to the experimenter as the 
consequences of the accident become more severe. Thus, Walster's 
hypothesis was not supported for the actor but was supported when 
observers rated the third party (i.e., the experimenter).
Eyewitness Account
A preliminary analysis of the tape recorded eyewitness descrip­
tions of the accident revealed a number of tentative findings. Based 
on a previous study conducted by Costelloe and Prestholdt (1973) it 





















Figure 2. Mean responsibility attributed to 
stimulus persons as a function of 
severity of outcome.
40
would provide the interviewers with more accurate and more detailed 
descriptions of the events surrounding the accident. However, in the 
present study this hypothesis was not supported.
After witnessing the mild outcome conditions the observers 
calmly provided the interviewer with a very detailed and accurate 
description of the sequence of events which lead up to the accident.
Most observers reported that the actor turned on the equipment and they 
accurately indicated the number of switches that the actor flipped. 
Consistent with the attribution of responsibility data, observers in 
this condition reported that the actor was responsible for the accident 
and most observers reported that he intended to examine the equipment.
On the other hand, when the consequences were severe, the 
observers appeared excited and nervous. They spoke quickly and omitted 
more of the important events which led up to the accident than did 
observers in the mild outcome condition. They reported that, "It all 
happened so fast I can't remember what happened!" They could not re­
member if the actor turned on the equipment. Thus, observers in the 
severe outcome conditions may have been attempting to avoid possible 
blame for the accident by "forgetting" what happened or by not reporting 
important details.
In addition, it appears that the stimulus person who was hurt
may have had effects upon the observer's eyewitness account. When
the actor injured himself the observers showed a great deal of concern
for him. This behavior was consistent with the results of the person
perception data which indicated that observers perceived the actor more 
favorably when he injured himself.
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On the other hand, when the actor injured the innocent by­
stander the observers did not like the actor and they moralized about 
what a bad person he was especially when the actor injured the by­
stander severely. For example, observers stated, "I can't believe he 
did that" or "I can't believe that guy is in college." Thus, while 
these findings are tentative, they do appear to be consistent with, 
and provide greater insight into, the results obtained on the person 
perception and attribution of responsibility data.
DISCUSSION
The results of this study were generally consistent with the 
notion that an observer is motivated to engage in cognitive processes 
which enable him to "explain" or make sense of the occurrence of an 
accident. At the same time, findings were obtained which indicated 
that a reexamination of these formulations may be necessary.
Attribution of Responsibility
Walster has proposed that while an observer may feel sympathe­
tic toward a person involved in a mild accident, attributing his plight 
to chance, he will not be so inclined when the outcome is severe. For 
a perceiver to attribute a serious accident to chance implies that an 
accident of equal magnitude could perhaps happen to him. Alterna­
tively, by blaming the persons potentially at fault the observer can 
reassure himself that a similar accident will not befall him. Thus, 
Walster proposed the hypothesis that greater responsibility will be 
attributed to those persons potentially at fault for an accident when 
the outcome is severe than when the outcome is mild.
However, this hypothesis was not supported for the two primary 
stimulus persons since increasing the severity of outcome did not 
reliably produce increments in attributed responsibility. In fact, it 
was found that observers attributed significantly less responsibility 
to the actor in the severe outcome condition ilutn in the mild outcome
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condition. This finding directly contradicted Walster's formulation 
of self-protective attribution of responsibility.
Furthermore, since the accident in this study involved two 
stimulus persons, it was expected that observers might also perceive 
the bystander as being potentially at fault and therefore attribute 
greater responsibility to him when the outcome was severe. While the 
means of responsibility attributed to the bystander were in the predicted 
direction they did not significantly differ across outcome conditions. 
Thus, this finding again failed to support Walster's formulation of 
self-protective attribution of responsibility.
However, Walster's hypothesis did receive some support when we 
look at the responsibility attributed to a third party who was not 
directly involved in the accident but was potentially at fault. Here 
it was found that more responsibility was attributed to a third party 
(the experimenLer) in the severe outcome condition than in the mild out­
come condition.
This finding raised the possibility that in studies which have 
failed to obtain results consistent with Walster's formulation of self- 
protective attribution of responsibility some third party not directly 
involved in the accident may have been perceived as ultimately respon­
sible. This may have been the reason that subjects did not differen­
tially attribute responsibility to the stimulus person across severity 
of outcome conditions in previous studies.
One example of this may be found in the third experiment of 
Shaver's study. He found that observers did not differentially
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attribute responsibility to the stimulus person even though there were 
significant differences in the perceived severity of outcome. Shaver's 
results indicated that subjects did not attribute more responsibility 
to the metals technician when his actions resulted in a serious outcome 
(the loss of a child's eyesight) than when his actions resulted in a 
mild outcome (the child's wrist was injured). In this situation the 
observers may actually have perceived the technician's supervisor, or 
the company which manufactured the equipment as a third party poten­
tially at fault for the accident. The subjects may have attributed 
greater responsibility to these third parties in the severe outcome 
condition than in the mild outcome condition, but Shaver failed to 
collect this information.
Overall, then, Walster's hypothesis was not supported for the 
bystander, and it was reversed for the actor, but some support was 
found when observers rated the third party. This pattern of results 
suggested that the attribution of responsibility data may be explained 
more satisfactorily within the context of Shaver's formulation of 
defensive attribution.
While Walster has proposed that an observer will attribute 
greater responsibility to a stimulus person when the outcome of an 
accident is severe than when the outcome is mild, Shaver has reformu­
lated this reasoning. He proposed that an important variable which 
effects the attribution of responsibility is the degree of similarity 
between the observer and the stimulus person. Specifically, Shaver 
proposed that when the degree of similarity is low, the observer can
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differentiate himself from the stimulus person by reasoning, "I am a 
different kind of person than he is and I would have acted uifferently 
in that situation." Under these conditions he proposed that the 
observer will attribute responsibility to the stimulus person.
On the other hand, he proposed that when the degree of simi­
larity between the observer and the stimulus person is high,it is 
difficult for the observer to differentiate himself from the stimulus 
person. If the observer attributed responsibility to a similar 
stimulus person it would carry the implication that if he had been the 
actor, observers would also attribute responsibility to him. Thus, 
Shaver proposed that under "similar" conditions observers would 
attribute less responsibility and ascribe greater degrees of careful­
ness to the stimulus person. In other words, the observer reasons,
"I am similar to him; therefore, he is not responsible because he is 
careful, just like I am." This notion was supported by McKillip and 
Posovac who demonstrated that less responsibility and greater degrees 
of carefulness were attributed to a "similar" stimulus person than to 
a "dissimilar" stimulus person in the severe outcome condition of their 
study.
Since the observers in the present study were told that the 
subjects they were to observe had also been recruited from other intro­
ductory psychology classes the degree of perceived similarity between 
the observers and the stimulus persons may have been higher than the 
degree of perceived similarity between the observer and the experi­
menter. The results of the attribution of responsibility data, then,
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are consistent with Shaver's formulation since the observers attributed 
less responsibility and greater degrees of carefulness to a similar 
stimulus person (the actor), but attributed more responsibility to a 
dissimilar stimulus person (the experimenter) when the outcome of the 
accident was severe.
The results of the eyewitness accounts of the accident also 
suggested that the actor was perceived as "similar" and that the third 
party was perceived as "dissimilar," since for the actor observers 
stated, "He's only a freshman, he didn't know any better" or "I'm sure 
he didn't know what he was doing." On the other hand, in reference to 
the third party observers stated, "He's older, he should have known 
better" or "He should have known this would happen" or "He should have 
put a sign on the equipment" and "If that's his equipment he should 
have known not to leave it plugged in." Apparently, the observers 
were trying to protect the similar stimulus person from possible blame. 
If the observer did attribute responsibility to the similar stimulus 
person, it would carry the implication that if the observer had been 
the actor, other observers would hold him responsible.
Thus, the results of the responsibility data suggested that 
self-protective attribution of responsibility may be employed by ob­
servers as a means of "explaining" the occurrence of an accident under 
conditions in which the observer is able to differentiate himself from 
the potential perpetrator (stimulus person). Furthermore, the results 
suggested that this is likely to happen when the person potentially at 
fault is a third party not directly involved in the accident. At the
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same time, the results suggested that under conditions in which the 
observer is unable to differentiate himself from the potential perpe­
trator, he may attribute less responsibility and greater degrees of 
carefulness to the stimulus person when the outcome of an accident is 
severe.
Person Perception
The results of the person perception data must be interpreted 
more carefully, since Lerner's just world hypothesis served to guide 
rather than specify the predictions of this study. Specifically,
Lerner has proposed that when an observer cannot ascribe some misdeed 
to a suffering victim he will attempt to maintain his belief in a just 
world by persuading himself that the victim deserved his fate by 
virtue of being a bad, undesirable person.
Since the bystander had engaged in no misdeed and had done 
nothing to merit his injury it was expected that observers would come 
to terms with this unjust situation by derrogating him and perceiving 
him less favorably than when he was not injured. However, the results 
indicated that whether or not the bystander was injured, no significant 
differences in the observer's perceptions of him were found. This 
finding was surprising, since the condition in which the bystander was 
injured closely replicated the procedure employed by Lerner.
By extending the just world hypothesis it was expected that 
when the actor hurt the bystander observers would also derrogate the 
actor, since he was the one who created the unjust situation. The sig­
nificant effect that was found when the actor injured the bystander
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supported this hypothesis. That is, observers perceived the actor 
less favorably when he injured the bystander than when he injured him­
self. The analysis of the eyewitness accounts provided some insight 
into how the observers were perceiving the actor when he injured the 
bystander. While the observers expressed sympathy for the bystander, 
they made these statements about the actor, "I can't believe he did 
that," and "I can't believe that guy's in college," and "I would never 
do something like thati he's stupid."
The observers apparently perceived the actor as being respon­
sible for the bystander's suffering, and this may have eliminated the 
need to derrogate the bystander. The observers may have been reason­
ing, "He suffered not because he is a bad, undesirable person, but 
because the actor touched that equipment." Therefore, the actor was 
derrogated, not the innocent bystander. In fact, since the actor 
engaged in behavior which resulted in injury to somebody in all condi­
tions, he was derrogated more than the bystander overall. Thus, the 
presence of the second stimulus person who engaged in a misdeed elimi­
nated the need for the observers to restore their belief in a just 
world by derrogating the bystander.
The results of the present study identified interrelationships 
between the various formulations which spell out reactions on the part 
of an observer who witnesses an accident. The findings of this study 
suggested that an observer of an accident may engage in a number of 
separate and distinct cognitive processes which enable him to "explain" 
the occurrence of an accident: (1) He can differeni_iate himself from
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the potential perpetrator, and attribute responsibility to that person 
as suggested by Walster; (2) If the perpetrator is highly similar to 
the observer, the observer may avoid the attribution of responsibility 
and ascribe greater degrees of carefulness to the perpetrator as sug­
gested by Shaver; (3) He can derrogate the victims and view them as 
bad, undesirable persons who deserved their fate as proposed by Lerner; 
or (4) He can misperceive the event, and thereby reconstruct the 
accident differently in an eyewitness account.
Two implications for future research are noted: First, the
responsibility attributed to the ’’third party” in this study suggests 
that in future research measures should be employed which assess respon­
sibility attributed to other parties potentially at fault. Second, the 
contradictory results obtained in previous research on the attribution 
of responsibility suggested that "real life" situations may increase 
the need to engage in attribution processes since the relevance of the 
situation is increased.
The results of the present study also suggested that neither 
Walster's formulation of self-protective attribution of responsibility, 
nor Lerner's just world hypothesis provided an adequate explanation of 
the results. In addition, the effects of the similarity of the stimu­
lus persons and the observer were not predicted on the basis of either 
of these formulations and Shaver's notion had to be used as a post hoc 
explanation. It appears that in order to answer the questions posed 
in this study further research is needed on the basic attribution
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process. Specifically, studies are needed which investigate the 
overall processes employed by observers to explain an accident in 
addition to research which focuses on small segments of the overall 
picture.
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Nods yes (up/down) __________________________________  _______
Nods no (left/right) ________________________________ __________
Smiles _______________________________________________ _______
Frowns _______________________________________________ _______
Points with finger __________________________________  _______
Signals yes (come on) _______________________________ __________
Signals no (stop) ___________________________________  _______
Leans Forward _______________________________________ __________
Leans Backward ______________________________________ __________
Other Cues:
( )  _______
( )  _______
( )  _______
( )  _______









































ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ATTRIBUTION 
OF RESPONSIBILITY
Source d.f. M.S. F P.
Accident Victim (A) 1 0.50 0.93 .7588
Severity of Outcome (B) 1 5.70 1.05 .3085
A X B 1 0.74 0.13 .7199
Sex (C) 1 0.94 0.17 .6815
A X C 1 0.20 0.04 .8407
B X C 1 5.70 1.06 .3085
A X B X C 1 5.70 1.06 .3085
Subject (A X B X C) 72 5.41
Rating (D) 2 828.33 114.57 .0001
A X D 2 15.25 2.11 .1228
B X D 2 36.65 5.07 .0076
A X B X D 2 2 .28 0.32 .7348
C X D 2 4.38 0.61 .5515
A X C X D 2 S. 48 1.31 .2719
B X C X D 2 4.28 0.59 .5598
A X B X C X D 2 5.10 0.71 .5002




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR POOLED 
PERSON PERCEPTION MEASURES
Source d.f. M.S. F P-
Accident Victim (A) 1 41.00 0.86 .6416
Severity of Outcome (B) 1 10.51 0.22 . 6446
A X B 1 124.27 2.61 . 1061
Sex (C) 1 4.56 0.09 .7557
A X C 1 26.41 0.56 .5352
B X C 1 3.31 0.07 .7886
A X B X C 1 195.81 4.12 .0433
Subject (A X B X C) 72 47.47
Rating (D) 1 68.91 6.53 .0122
A X D 1 91.51 8.67 .0046
B X D 1 3.91 0.37 .5517
A X B X D 1 2 .55 0.21 .6500
C X D 1 28.06 2.66 . 1033
A X C X D 1 26.41 2 .50 .1140
B X C X D 1 0.51 0.04 .8218




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR INDIVIDUAL PERSON PERCEPTION MEASURES
Source d.f.
V. 1. Cooperative- 
Uncooperative 
M.S. F. p.
V. 2. Good-Bad 
M.S. F. p.
V. 3. Likeable- 
Unlikeable 
M.S. F. p.
Accident Victim (A) 1 7.23 2.08 .1502 1.23 0.27 .6130 6.40 1.53 .2178
Severity of Outcome (B) 1 0.03 0.01 .9303 2.03 0.44 .5154 0.90 0.22 .6491
A X B 1 6.40 1.84 .1760 0.63 0.13 .7141 28.90 6.90 .0102
Sex (C) 1 8.10 2.33 .1275 5.63 1.23 .2709 0.90 0.22 .6491
A X C 1 7.23 2.08 .1502 0.03 0.01 .9395 8.10 1.94 .1649
B X C 1 0.63 0.18 .6765 1.23 0.27 .6130 0.10 0.02 .8721
A X B X C 1 4.90 1.41 .2374 2.03 0.44 .5154 28.90 6.90 .0102
Subject (A X B X C) 72 3.48 4.58 4.18
Rating (D) 1 13.23 7.35 .0083 16.90 15.10 .0005 3.60 1.93 .1651
A X D 1 10.00 5.56 .0199 6.40 5.72 .0184 3.60 1.93 .1651
B X D 1 0.40 0.22 .6438 0.01 0.09 .7635 0.10 0.05 .8123
A X B X D 1 4.23 2.35 .1258 2.50 2.23 .1356 0.10 0.05 .8123
C X D 1 5.63 3.13 .0775 0.90 0.80 .6237 6.40 3.44 .0644
A X C X D 1 0.90 0.50 .5114 8.10 7.24 .0087 1.60 0.86 .6404
B X C X D 1 0.90 0.50 .5114 0.10 0.09 .7635 0.00 0.00 1.0000
A X B X C X D 1 0.23 0.13 .7249 0.40 0.36 .5589 3.60 1.93 .1651





V. 4. Aware- V. 5. Aggressive- V. 6. Pleasant-
Unaware Unaggressive Unpleasant
Source d.f. M.S. F. p. M.S. F. p. M.S. F. p.
Accident Victim (A) 1 0.06 0.01 .9106 0.10 0.03 .8674 0.01 0.00 .9678
Severity of Outcome (B) 1 0.16 0.03 .8518 4.90 1.26 .2640 1.41 0.34 .5662
A X B 1 0.01 0.00 .9702 1.23 0.32 .5828 3.91 0.96 .6673
Sex (C) 1 0.16 0.03 .8518 2.03 0.52 .5207 2.76 0.67 .5806
A X C 1 0.06 0.01 .9106 8.10 2.09 .1492 2.26 0.55 .5335
B X C 1 1.81 0.38 .5494 1.60 0.41 .5299 0.01 0.00 .9678
A X B X C 1 0.51 0.11 .7456 0.63 0.16 .6920 21.76 5.33 .0225
Subject (A X B X C) 72 4.82 3.88 4.09
Rating (D) 1 0.16 0.05 .8138 18.23 3.00 .0839 13.81 9.36 .0034
A X D 1 0.01 0.00 .9624 0.90 0.15 .7033 7.66 5.19 .0241
B X D 1 3.91 1.32 .2532 6.40 1.05 .3090 2.26 1.53 .2177
A X B X D 1 0.06 0.02 .8858 5.63 0.93 .6590 1.06 0.72 .5952
C X D 1 3.91 1.32 .2532 2.03 0.33 .5735 2.26 1.53 .2177
A X C X D 1 9.51 3.21 .0737 8.10 1.33 .2508 2.76 1.87 .1724
B X C X D 1 1.06 0.36 .5592 8.10 1.33 .2508 0.51 0.34 .5667
A X B X C X D 1 0.76 0.26 .6208 2.03 0.33 .5725 1.06 0.72 .5952




V. 7. Kind- Cruel V. 8. Active- V. 9. Creative-
Passive Uncreative
Source d.f. M.S. F. P- M.S. F. P- M.S. F. P.
Accident Victim (A) 1 8.10 1.75 .1864 3.31 0.79 .6193 4.90 1.46 .2288
Severity of Outcome (B) 1 0.63 0.14 .7150 3.91 0.93 .6611 0.03 0.01 .9290
A X B 1 3.03 0.66 .5736 1.81 0.43 .5204 6.40 1.91 .1681
Sex (C) 1 1.23 0.27 .6143 3.31 0.79 .6193 24.03 7.16 .0090
A X C 1 0.23 0.01 .9397 5.26 1.26 .2653 4.90 1.46 .2288
B X C 1 3.60 0.78 .6161 0.06 0.01 .9040 5.63 1.68 .1967
A X B X C 1 2.50 0.54 .5291 0.76 0.18 .6756 2.50 0.75 .6048
Subject (A X B X C) 72 4.62 4.19 3.36
Rating (D) 1 18.23 14.45 .0006 11.56 2.36 .1253 0.00 0.00 1.0000
A X D 1 2.03 1.61 .2065 0.16 0.03 .8531 7.23 2.72 .0997
B X D 1 2.50 1.98 .1599 1.06 0.22 .6490 2.50 0.94 .6631
A X B X D 1 0.40 0.32 .5819 0.31 0.06 .7989 0.23 0.08 .7692
C X D 1 0.00 0.00 .9955 6.01 1.22 .2715 1.60 0.60 .5535
A X C X D 1 10.00 7.93 .0064 6.81 2.39 .2410 0.23 0.08 .7692
B X C X D 1 0.03 0.02 .8834 1.41 0.29 .6005 1.60 0.60 .5535
A X B X C X D 1 2.03 1.61 .2065 0.65 0.01 .9114 0.23 0.08 .7692




V. 10. Lucky- V. 11. Attractive- V. 12. Desirable-
Unlucky Unattractive Undesirable
Source d.f. M.S. F. p. M.S. F. p. M.S. F. p
Accident Victim (A) 1 1.81 0.53 .5243 1.81 0.99 .6748 7.23 1.44 .2326
Severity of Outcome (B) 1 0.16 0.05 .8255 0.16 0.09 .7685 4.23 0.84 .6347
A X B 1 2.76 0.81 .6253 3.31 1.80 .1804 9.03 1.80 .1813
Sex (C) 1 1.41 0.41 .5297 6.01 3.27 .0710 3.60 0.72 .6951
A X C 1 5.26 1.54 .2158 2.76 1.50 .2220 0.90 0.18 .6770
B X C 1 0.31 0.09 .7628 2.26 1.23 .2704 6.40 1.27 .2620
A X B X C 1 6.81 2.00 .1582 0.51 0.28 .6073 6.40 1.27 .2620
Subject (A X B X C) 72 3.41 1.83 5.03
Rating (D) 1 8.56 2.12 .1465 26.41 14.85 .0005 2.03 1.88 .1708
A X D 1 33.31 8.23 .0056 0.31 0.17 .6836 5.63 5.23 .0236
B X D 1 0.31 0.08 .7805 0.06 0.03 .8536 0.23 0.21 .6534
A X B X D 1 3.91 0.97 .6698 1.06 0.59 .5503 2.03 1.88 .1708
C X D 1 13.81 3.41 .06 54 0.06 0.03 .8536 0.10 0.09 .7591
A X C X D 1 11.56 2.86 .8915 0.76 0.43 .5235 0.40 0.37 .5509
B X C X D 1 7.66 1.89 .1698 0.76 0.34 .5235 0.10 0.09 .7591
A X B X C X D 1 0.16 0.04 .8390 0.06 0.03 .8536 0.10 0.09 .7591
Residual 72 4.05 1.76 1.08
Corrected Total 159
TABLE 6 (Continued)
V. 13. Curious- V. 14. Helpful- V. 15. Benevolent-
Indifferent Unhelpful Malicious
Source d.f. M.S. F p. M.S. F. p. M.S. F. p.
Accident Victim (A) 1 2.50 0.55 .5335 1.60 0.47 .5006 2.50 0.72 .5974
Severity of Outcome (B) 1 2.03 0.45 .5128 12.10 3.58 .0592 1.23 0.35 .5606
A X B 1 0.90 0.20 .6614 3.03 0.90 .6506 0.90 0.26 .6176
Sex (C) 1 1.60 0.35 .5611 0.23 0.07 .7929 3.03 0.87 .6448
A X C 2.03 0.45 .5128 3.60 1.07 .3061 0.90 0.26 .6176
B X C 1 2.50 0.55 .5335 0.90 0.27 .6136 0.03 0.01 .9301
A X B X C 1 13.23 2.92 .0879 4.23 1.25 .2564 0.40 0.12 .7344
Subject (A X B X C) 72 4.53 3.38 3.46
Rating (D) 1 93.03 17.33 .0002 19.60 6.54 .0122 14.40 6.24 .0149
A X D 1 0.90 0.17 .6863 5.63 1.88 .1715 0.23 0.10 .7559
B X D 1 1.23 0.23 .6396 1.23 0.41 .5316 2.50 1.07 .3062
A X B X D 1 0.10 0.02 .8869 0.00 0.00 1.0000 1.23 0.52 .5207
C X D 1 19.60 3.65 .0568 1.60 0.53 .5259 1.60 0.68 .5831
A X C X D 1 1.23 0.23 .6396 0.63 0.21 .6539 0.23 0.10 .7559
B X C X D 1 0.90 0.17 .6863 7.23 2.41 .1209 3.60 1.53 .2172
A X B X C X D 1 0.63 0.12 .7336 5.40 2.14 .1444 0.23 0.10 .7559





V. 16. Careful 
Careless 
M.S. F. P-
Accident Victim (A) 1 0.00 0.00 1.0000
Severity of Outcome (B) 1 9.03 1.40 .2393
A X B 1 0.03 0.00 .9492
Sex (C) 1 1.23 0.19 .6684
A X C 1 2.03 0.31 .5840
B X C 1 10.00 1.55 .2149
A X B X C 1 0.40 0.06 .7996
Subject (A X B X C) 72 6.46
Rating (D) 1 99.23 18.64 .0002
A X D 1 18.23 3.42 .06 5 0
B X D 1 19.60 3.68 .0558
A X B X D 1 1.60 0.30 .5919
C X D 1 3.60 0.68 .5812
A X C X D 1 6.40 1.20 .2760
B X C X D 1 2.03 0.38 .5464
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